Initial Enumeration of the Domain
Identifying Hosts
Using Wireshark
$ sudo -E wireshark
11:28:20.487 Main Warn QStandardPaths: runtime directory '/run/user/1001' is not owned by UID 0, but a directory permissions 0700 owned by UID 1001 GID 1002
<SNIP>

ARP packets make us aware of the hosts: 172.16.5.5, 172.16.5.25 172.16.5.50, 172.16.5.100, and 172.16.5.125.

MDNS makes us aware of the ACADEMY-EA-WEB01 host.
Command in tcpdump
$ sudo tcpdump -i ens224
Using Responder
$ sudo responder -I ens224 -A
As we start Responder with passive analysis mode enabled, we will see requests flow in our session. Notice below that we found a few unique hosts not previously mentioned in our Wireshark captures. It's worth noting these down as we are starting to build a nice target list of IPs and DNS hostnames.
Active Check using fping
Flags
a - alive hosts
s - stats
g - generate list from cidr
q - to not show per-target reults
$ fping -asgq 172.16.5.0/23
172.16.5.5
172.16.5.25
172.16.5.50
172.16.5.100
172.16.5.125
172.16.5.200
172.16.5.225
172.16.5.238
172.16.5.240
510 targets
9 alive
501 unreachable
0 unknown addresses
2004 timeouts (waiting for response)
2013 ICMP Echos sent
9 ICMP Echo Replies received
2004 other ICMP received
0.029 ms (min round trip time)
0.396 ms (avg round trip time)
0.799 ms (max round trip time)
15.366 sec (elapsed real time)
Scanning Using NMAP
Now that we have a list of active hosts, we can enumerate the hosts further. We need to find what services are running on each hosts.
$ sudo nmap -v -A -iL hosts.txt -oN /home/htb-student/Documents/host-enum
Nmap scan report for inlanefreight.local (172.16.5.5)
Host is up (0.069s latency).
Not shown: 987 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/tcp open domain Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2022-04-04 15:12:06Z)
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: 2022-04-04T15:12:53+00:00; -1s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject:
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:ACADEMY-EA-DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
| Issuer: commonName=INLANEFREIGHT-CA
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2022-03-30T22:40:24
| Not valid after: 2023-03-30T22:40:24
| MD5: 3a09 d87a 9ccb 5498 2533 e339 ebe3 443f
|_SHA-1: 9731 d8ec b219 4301 c231 793e f913 6868 d39f 7920
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open ssl/ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
<SNIP>
3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open ssl/ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
| rdp-ntlm-info:
| Target_Name: INLANEFREIGHT
| NetBIOS_Domain_Name: INLANEFREIGHT
| NetBIOS_Computer_Name: ACADEMY-EA-DC01
| DNS_Domain_Name: INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
| DNS_Computer_Name: ACADEMY-EA-DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
| DNS_Tree_Name: INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
| Product_Version: 10.0.17763
|_ System_Time: 2022-04-04T15:12:45+00:00
<SNIP>
5357/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Service Unavailable
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
Service Info: Host: ACADEMY-EA-DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Our scans have provided us with the naming standard used by NetBIOS and DNS, we can see some hosts have RDP open, and they have pointed us in the direction of the primary
Domain Controller
for the INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL domain (ACADEMY-EA-DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL). The results below show some interesting results surrounding a possibly outdated host.
Identifying Users
Kerbrute
Uses kerberos pre-authentication so it's stealthier because it won't generate any alerts.
Preferrably use Insidetrust (Statistically Likely Usernames) wordlist
Installation
$ sudo git clone https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute.git
$ sudo make all
$ ls dist/
kerbrute_darwin_amd64 kerbrute_linux_386 kerbrute_linux_amd64 kerbrute_windows_386.exe kerbrute_windows_amd64.exe
$ ./kerbrute_linux_amd64
__ __ __
/ /_____ _____/ /_ _______ __/ /____
/ //_/ _ \/ ___/ __ \/ ___/ / / / __/ _ \
/ ,< / __/ / / /_/ / / / /_/ / /_/ __/
/_/|_|\___/_/ /_.___/_/ \__,_/\__/\___/
Version: dev (9cfb81e) - 02/17/22 - Ronnie Flathers @ropnop
This tool is designed to assist in quickly bruteforcing valid Active Directory accounts through Kerberos Pre-Authentication.
It is designed to be used on an internal Windows domain with access to one of the Domain Controllers.
Warning: failed Kerberos Pre-Auth counts as a failed login and WILL lock out accounts
Usage:
kerbrute [command]
<SNIP>
Usage
$ kerbrute userenum -d INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL --dc 172.16.5.5 jsmith.txt -o valid_ad_users
2021/11/17 23:01:46 > Using KDC(s):
2021/11/17 23:01:46 > 172.16.5.5:88
2021/11/17 23:01:46 > [+] VALID USERNAME: jjones@INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
2021/11/17 23:01:46 > [+] VALID USERNAME: sbrown@INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
2021/11/17 23:01:46 > [+] VALID USERNAME: tjohnson@INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
2021/11/17 23:01:50 > [+] VALID USERNAME: evalentin@INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
<SNIP>
2021/11/17 23:01:51 > [+] VALID USERNAME: sgage@INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
2021/11/17 23:01:51 > [+] VALID USERNAME: jshay@INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
2021/11/17 23:01:51 > [+] VALID USERNAME: jhermann@INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
2021/11/17 23:01:51 > [+] VALID USERNAME: whouse@INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
2021/11/17 23:01:51 > [+] VALID USERNAME: emercer@INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
2021/11/17 23:01:52 > [+] VALID USERNAME: wshepherd@INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
2021/11/17 23:01:56 > Done! Tested 48705 usernames (56 valid) in 9.940 seconds
Identifying Potential Vulnerabilities
There are several ways to gain SYSTEM-level access on a host, including but not limited to:
Remote Windows exploits such as MS08-067, EternalBlue, or BlueKeep.
Abusing a service running in the context of the
SYSTEM account
, or abusing the service accountSeImpersonate
privileges using Juicy Potato. This type of attack is possible on older Windows OS' but not always possible with Windows Server 2019.Local privilege escalation flaws in Windows operating systems such as the Windows 10 Task Scheduler 0-day.
Gaining admin access on a domain-joined host with a local account and using Psexec to launch a SYSTEM cmd window
By gaining SYSTEM-level access on a domain-joined host, you will be able to perform actions such as, but not limited to:
Enumerate the domain using built-in tools or offensive tools such as BloodHound and PowerView.
Perform Kerberoasting / ASREPRoasting attacks within the same domain.
Run tools such as Inveigh to gather Net-NTLMv2 hashes or perform SMB relay attacks.
Perform token impersonation to hijack a privileged domain user account.
Carry out ACL attacks.
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